Working papers
The Role of Confidence for Disputes [New version coming soon] In this model, agents with differing views decide which views to tolerate. The connections between these agents depend on their socialization efforts. Any remaining agents are in dispute. Benefits stem from disputes, which are contests between players, and increase in an agent's strength and confidence. An agent's strength is the number and weight of their connections, and their confidence depends on the number of connections who are in dispute with their opponent. The equilibrium network either consists of isolated echo chambers or opponents have mutual connections. Overall dispute intensity decreases in how much confidence agents derive through their connections if society consists of echo chambers and decreases otherwise. Encouraging socialization reduces dispute intensity when society is close to forming echo chambers. Homophily and Specialization in Networks, with Luca Paolo Merlino In this paper, players contribute to two local public goods for which they have different tastes and sponsor costly links to enjoy the provision of others. In equilibrium, either there are several contributors specialized in public good provision or only two contributors who are not entirely specialized. Higher linking costs have a non-monotonic impact on welfare and polarization, as they affect who specializes in public good provision. When the available budget is small, subsidies should be given to players who already specialize in public good provision; otherwise, they should target only one player who specializes in public good provision. Socially Disadvantaged Ethnic Groups and Distributive Politics, with Vangjel Bita and Aldo Elizalde This study examines whether socially disadvantaged ethnic groups practise favouritism when they reach national power. We use the case of Bolivia, where Evo Morales, a member of the traditionally disadvantaged Indigenous Aymara, became the first Indigenous president in 2005. We develop a theoretical framework to uncover the necessary conditions for favouritism. The incentives to practise favouritism vary according to the income and size of an ethnic group. In municipalities with higher incomes or relatively few Aymaras, favouritism is more likely. We investigate whether different forms of favouritism occur using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and a first difference estimator. Our empirical results show no evidence of favouritism towards Aymaras at the national level. However, we do find evidence for favouritism in high-income areas or where few Aymara live. Ethnic groups thus differ in how much they tend to practise favouritism and how much they suffer when others do so. |
Work in progress
Revealing Information - or not - in a Social Network of Traders, with Paolo Pin and Fernando Vega-Redondo