

PATRICK ALLMIS

(+32)456077744 ◊ pa509@cam.ac.uk ◊ [Website](#)

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics

Austin Robinson Building, Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom ◊ September, 2023

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Janeway Institute Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Cambridge	2023 - present
Postdoctoral Affiliate, Christ's College	2023 - present
Postdoctoral Fellow in Economics, Università degli Studi di Siena	2022 - 2023
Ph.D. Fellow in Economics, University of Antwerp	2018 - 2022

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Antwerp Supervisors: Luca Paolo Merlino and Bruno de Borger	2018 - 03/2023
Inter-university student, KU Leuven	2018 - 2019
M.Sc. in Economics, University of Copenhagen	2015 - 2018
B.Sc. in Economics, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich	2011 - 2015
Exchange student in Economics, Maastricht University	2013
German Abitur, Lise-Meitner Gymnasium Unterhaching	2011

RESEARCH INTEREST

Social & Economic Networks, Network Formation, Network Games

RESEARCH

Job Market Paper

The role of confidence for disputes

Working Papers

Polarization in endogenous networks, with Luca Paolo Merlino

Socially disadvantaged ethnic groups and distributive politics, with Vangjel Bitva & Aldo Elizalde

Work in progress

Revealing information – or not – in a social network of traders, with Paolo Pin & Fernando Vega-Redondo

CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

2023: CEPET 2023; Lisbon Meeting 2023; 8th Annual Conference on Network Science and Economics

2022: YETI 2022 Meeting; Università di Siena Seminar; CES Research Group “Networks and Games”; SasCa 2022; SING17; 8th Annual Conference on “Contests: Theory and Evidence” ; 21st Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet; 7th Annual Conference on Network Science and Economics; PhD Seminar at Aix-Marseille School of Economics; 15th RGS Doctoral Conference

2021: 2nd AMSE Summer School; SING16; Young Academics Networks Conference (Cambridge-INET)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee for: European Economic Review; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Economics Letters

RESEARCH VISITS

Virginia Tech *02/2023 - 03/2023*

Hosts: Sudipta Sarangi and Hector Tzavellas

Aix-Marseille School of Economics *02/2022 - 08/2022*

Host: Yann Bramoullé

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Cambridge, Christ's College: Industrial Economics *2023 - present*

University of Antwerp: International Economics *2019 - 2021*

Copenhagen Business School *2016 - 2018*

- Macroeconomics
- Quantitative Business Research
- Microeconomics

LANGUAGE AND TECHNICAL SKILLS

Language German (Native), English (Fluent)

Software & Tools Matlab, Mathematica, LaTeX

ACADEMIC REFERENCES

Luca Paolo Merlino

ECARES, Université libre de Bruxelles

luca.paolo.merlino "at" ulb.be

+32(0)476057840

Paolo Pin

Università di Siena & Università Bocconi

paolo.pin "at" unisi.it

+39(0)3486033402

Yann Bramoullé

Aix-Marseille School of Economics

yann.bramouille "at" univ-amu.fr

+33(0)413552534

Agnieszka Rusinowska

Paris School of Economics

agnieszka.rusinowska "at" univ-paris1.fr

+33(0)144078575

Georg Kirchsteiger

ECARES, Université libre de Bruxelles

georg.kirchsteiger "at" ulb.be

+32(0)26504212

The Role of Confidence for Disputes

In this model, agents with differing views decide which views to tolerate. The connections between these agents depend on their socialization efforts. Any remaining agents are in dispute. Benefits stem from disputes, which are contests between players, and increase in an agent's strength and confidence. An agent's strength is the number and weight of their connections, and their confidence depends on the number of connections who are in dispute with their opponent. The equilibrium network either consists of isolated echo chambers or opponents have mutual connections. Overall dispute intensity decreases in how much confidence agents derive through their connections if society consists of echo chambers and decreases otherwise. Encouraging socialization reduces dispute intensity when society is close to forming echo chambers.

OTHER WORKING PAPERS

Polarization in Endogenous Networks, joint with Luca Paolo Merlino

In our model, players contribute to two local public goods for which they have different tastes and sponsor costly social connections to enjoy the provision of their neighbors. In any Nash equilibrium, either there are two large contributors who might free ride on each other, or several contributors whose neighborhood of free riders does not overlap. As linking costs increase, in the spillover maximizing equilibrium players link to large contributors closer to their own type, i.e., homophily increases. Polarization increases if links are cheap to begin with, and decreases otherwise. Moreover, if moderate agents emerge as large contributors, welfare increases while polarization decreases in societies with low extremism.

Socially disadvantaged ethnic groups and distributive politics, joint with Vangjel Bitu and Aldo Elizalde

This study examines whether socially disadvantaged ethnic groups practise favouritism when they reach national power. We use the case of Bolivia, where Evo Morales, a member of the traditionally disadvantaged Indigenous Aymara, became the first Indigenous president in 2005. We develop a theoretical framework to uncover the necessary conditions for favouritism. The incentives to practise favouritism vary according to the income and size of an ethnic group. In municipalities with higher incomes or relatively few Aymaras, favouritism is more likely. We investigate whether different forms of favouritism occur using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and a first difference estimator. Our empirical results show no evidence of favouritism towards Aymaras at the national level. However, we do find evidence for favouritism in high-income areas or where few Aymara live. Ethnic groups thus differ in how much they tend to practise favouritism and how much they suffer when others do so.